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Maximizing the recovery of oil and gas resources has become an Important national energy goal. In this article, the author addresses the
possibility of federal administrative orders requiring secondary and tertiary operations (STR) on leases within federal unit agreements. Issues
surrounding such orders are addressed, Including the Impact of STR
orders on offshore leases and problems created by conflicting state conservation laws.

LEGAL ISSUES IN IMPLEMENTING
SECONDARY AND TERTIARY
RECOVERY OPERATIONS ON
FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES
Douglas V. Fant*
The federal government's desire to increase revenues from use of
federal lands and its policy to make the United States less dependent on
foreign energy sources has prompted the federal government in its role as
lessor of public and Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) lands to seek increased
oil and gas production from those lands.' Additionally, with world oil prices
remaining stable around thirty dollars a barrel more lessees are attempting
and leases by
to maximize production and extend the lives of older oil fields
2
employing secondary and tertiary recovery techniques.
*Douglas V. Fant (A.B. History, Stanford University, 1974; J.D., Stanford Law School,
1977) is a member of the Arizona, California, District of Columbia and Texas (pending)
bars and Assistant Counsel for the Union Oil Company of California.
1. See, e.g., the report prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy, Bartlesville Energy
Technology Center, entitled Enhanced Oil Recovery in the Gulf of Mezico (Lewin and
Associates, May 1982).
2. Secondary recovery of hydrocarbon resources includes all methods of resource extraction
in which the lessees utilize energy sources which are extrinsic to the natural pressures in
the reservoir.
A subcommittee of the American Petroleum Institute defined "secondary recovery"
more formally as "the oil, gas, or oil and gas recovered by any method (artificial flowing
or pumping) that may be employed to produce them through the joint use of two or more
well bores. Secondary recovery is generally recognized as being that recovery which may
be obtained by the injection of liquids or gases into the reservoir for the purpose of
augmenting reservoir energy." AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, SECONDARY
RECOVERY OF OIL IN THE UNITED STATES 255 (1942).

Tertiary recovery generally involves enhancing the characteristics of the reservoir
through the use of chemicals or heat so as to produce hydrocarbons. "Enhanced recovery

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1984

1

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 19 [1984], Iss. 1, Art. 1
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XIX

The confluence of stable oil prices, increasing experimentation with
secondary and tertiary recovery techniques, and growing federal revenue
needs, raises the question of whether the agencies responsible for leasing
federal lands and for managing oil and gas operations on federal lands, the
Minerals Management Service (MMS) or Bureau of Land Management
(BLM), could order a federal oil and gas lessee or a state oil and gas lessee
within a federal unit agreement s to participate in a secondary or tertiary
recovery project (STR operations). 4
Secondary and tertiary recovery operations refer to a lessee's effort to
stimulate oil production after a reservoir's original or primary pressure,
which forces oil to the wells, has been dissipated. STR operations involve a
number of processes. The most common methods include injection of gas or
water into an underlying oil or gas pool to maintain or increase reservoir
pressure, 5 or injection of steam or chemicals with water into the reservoir
so as to improve the migration of resources to the producing wells. Continued high world oil prices have in part promoted increased experimentation with more exotic (and costly) techniques to increase oil production
from currently producing fields.6
Although the issue of the power of the BLM, MMS, or the predecessor
agency for administering federal oil and gas leases, the United States
Geological Survey (USGS), to compel STR operations could arise in a variety of factual situations involving federal lands, the three most likely STR
orders would apply to:
of crude oil requires a means for displacing oil from the reservoir rock, modifying the properties of the fluids in the reservoir and/or reservoir rock to cause movement of crude oil
in an efficient manner, and providing the energy and drive mechanism to force its flow to
a production well." Hearingsbefore the Subcommittee on Energy of the Senate Committee
on Finance, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 570 (1973).
3. See infra note 10 and accompanying text.
4. Pursuant to a recent order of former Secretary of the Interior James Watt, the MMS administers operations on Outer Continental Shelf lands, while the BLM administers operations on public or onshore lands. See Secretarial Order No. 3087, issued December 3,
1982; implemented 48 Fed. Reg. 8982 (1983).
5. Generally lessees do not reinject oil back into the reservoir since the primary purpose for
drilling any lease is the production of any underlying oil. Moreover, there are cheaper and
more abundant fluids such as water to employ for fluid-drive purposes.
6. There are a panoply of enhanced recovery techniques such as alkaline flooding (a water
flooding technique utilizing alkali metals); conventional steam drive injection (injection of
steam into one set of wells so as to displace oil toward a second set of wells); cyclic steam
injection (the alternating of steam injection and oil
production from the same set of wells);
enhanced heavy oil recovery; immiscible gas displacement (injection of non-hydrocarbon
gas into an oil reservoir); in situ combustion (combustion of oil in the reservoir, sustained
by continuous air injection, to displace unburned oil toward producing wells); microemulsion flooding (a water flooding technique in which a surfactant system is injected in order
to enhance oil displacement toward producing wells); miscible fluid displacement (same as
immiscible fluid injection, except that injected fluid and reservoir oil are expected to mix
and be produced together); and polymer augmented waterflooding (a waterflooding
technique similar to microemulsion flooding).
This list is not complete as new and more sophisticated enhanced recovery techniques are
constantly being evaluated.
Costs for engaging in secondary recovery operations rose an average of 16.7% in 1982.
See Costs andIndexes for Domestic Oil and Gas FieldEquipment andProductionOperations, NATIONAL ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, Forrestal Building,
Washington, D.C.
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(1) a federal oil and gas lease within the purview of a federal
unit agreement;
(2) an oil and gas lease on state lands which is within the purview of a federal unit agreement; and
(3) a non-unitized federal oil and gas lease. 7
I. FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASE WITHIN A UNIT AGREEMENT

It would be difficult for the federal government to require a multitude
of federal oil and gas lessees whose leases are independently located over a
common oil and gas reservoir to produce each lease so as to conserve oil
and gas resources in the entire reservoir. Instead, Congress has provided
the MMS with the power to require lessees to combine their efforts as a
remedy for conserving oil and gas resources where production from two or
more adjacent leases located on a common oil and gas reservoir is
involved. 8
A. Unit Agreements.
The federal government has traditionally resorted to unit agreements
to resolve production problems where two or more federal leases are
located on the same oil and gas reservoir. Use of a unit agreement allows
production and operations to be conducted on a reservoir-wide basis rather
than on a lease-by-lease basis. Reservoir-wide management of the reservoir
prevents unnecessary wells from being drilled and prevents a wasteful
dissipation of the reservoir's energy. This, in turn, usually increases the
ultimate recovery of oil and gas resources from the reservoir.9
7. Another variable to consider within the context of these categories is whether the MMS
order relates to oil and gas leases on lands located on or offshore.
8. "The Secretary may at any time prescribe and amend such rules and regulations as he
determines to be necessary and proper in order to provide for the prevention of waste
and conservation of the natural resources of the outer Continental Shelf, and the protection of correlative rights therein . . . (4) for unitization, pooling and drilling
agreements ....
43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) and (aX4) (Supp. V 1981).
Onshore the power of the Secretary to require unitization is somewhat unclear: "For the
purpose of more properly conserving the natural resources of any oil or gas pool, field, or
like area, or any part thereof... lessees thereof... may unite with each other.., in collectively adopting and operating under a cooperative or unit plan of development...
whenever determined and certified by the Secretary of the Interior to be necessary or advisable in the public interest." 30 U.S.C. § 2260) (1976).
The preceding paragraph does not specifically empower the Secretary to require unitization; however, subsection (6)later generally authorizes the Secretary to prescribe conditions and "approve operating, drilling, or development contracts . . . whenever in his
discretion, t e conservation of natural products or the public convenience or necessity
may require it or the interests of the United States may be best subserved thereby." Id.
The power to enter into contracts to "conserve natural products" likely includes the
power to require onshore lessees to unitize adjacent federal leases in order to maximize
production of oil and gas resources beneath the leases.
In any case, the issue of compulsory unitization rarely arises onshore since most lessees
will voluntarily enter into a unit agreement if the lessees believe that greater oil and gas
production will result from unitizing adjacent leases.
9. See, e.g., Kaveler, The EngineeringBasisforand the Resultsfrom the Unit Operationof
Oil Pools, 23 TUL. L. REv. 331 (1949).
It is technically impossible to recover 100% of the oil and gas resources from an oil and
gas reservoir. During initial production from a field, natural reservoir energy forces
petroleum into the well bore where it can then be pumped to the surface. There are three
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A discussion of the significance of a unit agreement on the MMS' power
to compel STR operations best begins with definition of the term "unit."
The term is generally defined as
an area of land, deposit, or deposits of minerals, stratum or strata,
or pool or pools, or a part or parts thereof, as to which parties with
interests therein are bound to share minerals produced on a
specified basis and as to which those having the right to conduct
drilling or mining operations therein are bound to share investment and operating costs on a specified basis. A unit may be formed by convention or by order of an agency of the state or federal
government empowered to do so. A unit formed by order of a
governmental agency is termed a 'compulsory' unit. 10
Operations on a unit are conducted under a unit agreement. A "unit
agreement" is defined by the MMS as "an agreement or plan of development and operation for the recovery of oil and gas made subject thereto as
a single consolidated unit without regard to separate ownerships and for
the allocation of costs and benefits on a basis as defined in the agreement or
plan."l"
In short, once the leases are unitized, the lessees are bound by contract
or by governmental order to engage in a common development and production scheme. Lease boundaries are ignored for the purposes of the unit
agreement. Not surprisingly, unit provisions concerning development then
displace inconsistent express or implied provisions of the underlying
lease. 12 Thus, the unit agreement itself may provide for secondary or tertiary recovery operations to be undertaken and the lessee would be contractually bound thereby.
Unit agreements usually spell out drilling obligations which are
necessary to retain leases within the unit; however, those obligations relate
to drilling of individual wells and therefore are spacial in character and
limited in duration. Generally, questions of STR operations are not
specifically addressed in federal unit agreements.
The current federal unit agreement forms are silent as to the power of
the lessor to require secondary and tertiary recovery operations. The
model unit agreement for onshore units, GFS-Form 45, and the proposed
model unit agreement for OCS operations, GFS-Form 201, contain no express provisions by which the MMS or BLM could compel lessees within
that unit to engage in STR operations.' 3

10.
11.

12.
13.

natural sources of reservoir energy in an underground reservoir: (1) gas expansion; (2)
water encroachment; and (3) gravity. Once those forces have been dissipated, oil and gas
production will either decline or cease. Usually natural reservoir energy will help produce
20% or 30% of the oil and gas resources in a reservoir. By artificially maintaining or increasing the reservoir's energy through, e.g., STR operations, additional resources may
be recovered. For an extended discussion of petroleum geology and engineering, see INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMMISSION, OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION (University of
Oklahoma Press, 1951).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:213 (West 1975).
8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAw 798-99 (1982).
6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 11, at 734.
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act excludes Outer Continental Shelf Lands
from the definition of "public lands. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(e) (1976). A separate form of unit
agreement is necessary for onshore and offshore federal oil and gas leasing.
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B. Purpose of the Unit Agreement.
Even if a unit agreement contains no express provisions mandating
participation in secondary or tertiary recovery operations, one of the basic
purposes behind unitization is to avoid wasteful production practices and
thereby maximize recovery of the resources in place in the oil and gas
reservoir. 14 Thus, this purpose should be read into the terms of the unit
agreement and should influence the extent of production obligations
thereunder.
Two factors, however, limit the MMS' power to compel any particular
leasehold operation. First, if the lessee does not wish to comply with an
MMS order, the lessee may always relinquish his leasehold rights and avoid
imposition of any obligation which the lessee perceives to be onerous or unfair. 15 Given the significant investments necessary to develop oil and gas
leases, however, especially offshore leases, it is unrealistic to assume that
any lessee will lightly relinquish a producing lease. Second, any MMS order
must fall within a zone of reasonableness and not be confiscatory of the
lessee's leasehold rights.' 6 For example, it would not be reasonable for the
MMS to order STR operations where the entire underlying reservoir is not
subject to common control under the order. 17 Despite these general constraints, however, the MMS and BLM have a statutory and regulatory
basis for compelling secondary and tertiary recovery operations.' 8
C. The Authority of the MMS to Require STR Operations-OffshoreLeases.
Federal offshore oil and gas production operations are governed
primarily by a single statute, the OCS Lands Act, as amended. 19 Section
5(a) of the Act imposes a general duty upon the Secretary of the Interior to
conserve the naturalresourcesof the OCS. 2 0 This language is the basis for
MMS orders requiring OCS lessees to restrict oil or gas production so as to
maintain original reservoir pressure. 2' However, controlling rates of oil
14. See, e.g., 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 11, at § 913.1. Unit agreements are
not specifically created in order to engage in STR operations. STR operations, if successful, do increase production and increase the ultimate recovery of resources from the
reservoir.
15. 43 C.F.R. § 3320.1 (1982) (offshore); 43 C.F.R. § 3108.1 (1982) (onshore).
16. Sun Oil Company v. United States, 572 F.2d 786 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
17. It should also be noted that the following discussion is not applicable to individual leases,
but rather to entire units. It is entirely unrealistic to assume that the MMS would order
STR operations on a lease which covered only a portion of an underlying reservoir, since
adjacent lessees would then receive a windfall of increased production at the expense of
the unitized lessees who paid for and engaged in the STR operations.
18. In dicta, in one case involving an oil and a gas lease on the same allotted tribal lands, one
court stated that the lessor would have "just cause to complain, if an inefficient operation
of the leases resulted from the failure of the lessees to use improved [production] methods
which came in common use during the terms of the leases." Utilities Prod. Corp. v.
Carter Oil Co., 72 F.2d 655, 659 (10th Cir. 1934). However, the case involved a dispute
between the oil lessee and the gas lessee over rights to certain gas production and the
issue of compulsory STR operations was not at issue in the case. Otherwise the issue of
whether a lessor may compel a lessee to engage in STR operations has not been address-

ed by a court.

19. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
20. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (Supp. V 1981). See also Section 10 of the OCS lease form which
iterates the lessee's obligation: "After due notice in writing, the lessee shall drill such
wells and produce at such rates as the lessor may require in order that the leased area or
any part thereof may be properly and timely developed and produced in accordance with
sound operating principles.' (On file at Land & Water Law Review office).
21. See, e.g., OCS Order No. 11, Gulf of Mexico Area.
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and gas production to preserve and prolong the reservoir's original energy
oilfield practice and
and thereby prolong primary production
22 is a common
does not constitute an STR operation.
STR operations require the lessee to alter reservoir conditions, for example by increasing reservoir pressure, rather than merely producing the
reservoir under the same conditions in which the reservoir was originally
found. The conjunction of principles behind the OCS Lands Act and certain
developmental duties which are generally implied in oil and gas leases suggest that the MMS could require some form of gas/water/chemical stimulation of underlying reservoirs in order to enhance the ultimate recovery of
oil and gas in place.
The conservation and protection mandate can be interpreted to allow
the MMS to maximize the ultimate recovery of resources by ordering use of
secondary and/or tertiary recovery techniques. 23 First, generally recognized implied development covenants can be read into a federal OCS oil and
gas lease. Implied covenants generally have been read into federal oil and
gas leases as well as into state oil and gas leases or oil and gas leases between private parties. 2 4 It is difficult for the lessor and lessee to agree
when signing a lease and prior to any drilling how future production operations should be conducted. The fact that the lessor is the federal government alters neither the traditional interests of a lessor in maximizing
recovery of resources nor the inability of either the lessor or lessee to surmise what production techniques will insure maximum recovery. Thus, the
policy rationale behind application of the covenants to state or private oil
leases is equally applicable to oil and gas leases issued on federal
and gas
25
lands.
Unknown factors like geology, economic conditions, or reservoir
mechanics will affect how the lessee conducts operations. Thus, unlike most
other business contracts, an oil and gas lease leaves the heart of the
contract-production-related matters-open so that future events rather
than foresight shape development of the lease. Implied covenants,
created to facilitate management of posttherefore, have been judicially
26
development operations.
The unique parameters of this business transaction have led to implied
development-related covenants in oil and gas leases. The implied covenant
of reasonable development requires a lessee, after initiation of oil or gas
22. See Interim Notice to Lessees for implementing Section 606(dXl) of the OCS Lands Act
Amendments of 1978: Maximum Attainable Rate of Production.
23. Maximization of production is not to be confused with the maximum efficient rate of production which is also governed by the MMS. See supra note 22. The BLM may also
establish maximum efficient rates of production for onshore leases. See Section 4 of competitive and Section 4 of non-competitive public domain lands lease forms; and Section 5
of competitive and Section 5 of non-competitive acquired lands lease forms. Obviously,
any rate of production which exceeds the maximum efficient rate of recovery would not
constitute "conservation of natural resources" as, e.g., a premature "watering out" loss
of reservoir pressure, or loss of viscosity could result. This would lead to an overall
recovery of oil or gas which is less than that recovery which would have occurred without
the lessee engaging in such primary production methods.
24. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 786, 810 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
25. See 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 11, at § 832.
26. Id.
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production from the lease, to drill such additional wells as a reasonably prudent operator would drill under similar circumstances. 27 Or, more simply
stated, the lessee is under an obligation to use due diligence in producing
resources from the lease. A second catchall covenant, the covenant to use
reasonable care and due diligence in developing an oil and gas lease, requires a lessee to maximize the total amount of resources that are produced. 28 The duties of reasonable development and due diligence have been
found2 9to arise both in the primary as well as the secondary term of the
lease.
The rationale for the implied covenants is clear. The lessee covenanted
with the lessor to produce the oil and gas resources on the lease and to pay
a lessor a royalty on the resources produced. 0 Failure of the lessee
diligently to produce those resources denies the lessor the consideration for
the lease. 3' Moreover, it would be inequitable to allow the lessee to hold the
lease for a length of time without requiring the lessee to make a diligent effort to produce oil and gas. This would deprive the lessor not only of his express right under the lease to obtain royalties, but would also deprive him
of the opportunity to work the lease himself or, under the Rule of Capture,
produce all the resources of the reservoir. As stated by one court in a mining law case interpreting the development obligations under a mineral
lease: "It is of the essence of the lease, necessarily implied, that the lessee
32
shall work the mine with reasonable diligence, or surrender the lease."
That rationale is equally applicable, if not with greater force, to federal
OCS leases beyond their primary terms. As noted in a report prepared for
the Department of Energy on enhanced oil recovery in the Gulf of Mexico,
once the OCS platforms serving the offshore fields are removed, the prospects for STR operations "are virtually eliminated."8 Once the initial
surge of oil and gas production has occurred and production begins to
decline, erecting a platform on an OCS solely to engage in STR operations
would be cost prohibitive.
Thus, the alternative which the lessor enjoys with many onshore leases,
forcing the lessee to produce or surrender the lease, is effectively not
available on OCS leases with declining production curves. This suggests
that the only protection available to the lessor MMS is to extend the implied
covenants of reasonable development and due diligence to include STR
operations on OCS leases even if STR operations do not require the drilling
27. See Rush v. King Oil Co., 220 Kan. 616, 556 P.2d 431 (1976) for a detailed discussion of
the reasonable development covenant in Kansas.
28. See, e.g., Brown, Oil and Gas Lease-ImpliedCovenant to Use Due Care, 19 TEX. L. REV.
80 (1940).
29. Fox Petroleum Co. v. Booker, 123 Okla. 276, 253 P. 33 (1926) (primary term); Waggoner
Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 19 S.W.2d 27 (1929) (secondary term).
30. See, e.g., Sections 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the standard OCS Lease Form 3300-1, 43 Fed. Reg.
44893 (1978), as corrected in 43 Fed. Reg. 46586 (1978).

31. "The fundamental purpose of the mineral lease-the use for which it was intended by the
lease-is the production of minerals. Once production commences, the lessor is paid rent
for the leasd premises only by the royalty reserved in the lease. It is therefore the duty
of the lessee.. . to develop the leased premises properly and to prevent drainage of oil
and gas from beneath it ... "Williams v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 290 F. Supp. 408,
414 (E.D. La. 1968); a0Td, 432 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970).

32. George v. Jones, 168 Neb. 149, 95 N.W.2d 609 (1959).

33. See supra note 1, Enhanced Oil Recovery in the Gulf of Mexico.
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of additional wells. Otherwise, significant quantities of oil could be permanently lost to the lessor in derogation
of the lessor's statutory mission to
"conserve the resources of the OCS." 34 There is no second line of "lesseeproducers" to step into a leasehold vacated by the original lessee. This interpretation also furthers one of the primary policies behind passage of the
OCS Lands Act Amendments of 1978-the expedition and increase of oil
production from OCS leases.8 5
So long as significant economic burdens are not imposed-i.e. the profitability of the underlying leases is not totally vitiated, 36 the MMS'
statutory mandate to "conserve and protect the resources of the OCS"
should be construed to include the power to order STR operations on OCS
leases, since such operations are intended to conserve the resources by3 7increasing the ultimate production of oil from the underlying reservoir.
D. Application of STR Orders to Offshore Leases.
With the repeal of section 302(b) of the Department of Energy
Organization Act,38 the Secretary of Interior may once again establish
diligence requirements for federal leases and set maximum rates of production "which may be sustained without loss of ultimate recovery of oil or
gas." 39 While no diligence standards have been yet established, the MMS
could use its power to publish a regulation which defines diligence in light
34. ld.
35. "The purposes of this chapter are to-(l) establish policies and procedures for managing
the oil and natural gas resources of the Outer Continental Shelf which are intended to
result in expedited exploration and development of the Outer Continental Shelf in order
to achieve national economic and energy policy goals, assure national security, reduce
dependence on foreign sources, and maintain a favorable balance of payments in world
trade.... ." 43 U.S.C. § 1802(1) (Supp. V 1981).
36. Indeed, even "profitability" per se may not impose a limit upon the MMS' power to impose STR operational requirements. See FERC v. Pennzoil Producing Co., 439 U.S. 508,
519 (1979), wherein the Supreme Court in a case involving a natural gas pricing dispute
noted that the FERC was "under no obligation automatically to relieve the bind on producers facing increased royalty costs based in unregulated prices."
37. There is one exception to that general conclusion. That is, the MMS probably cannot require a lessee to reinject natural gas already produced back into the reservoir so as to
maintain or improve reservoir pressure.
Once the lessee has brought either oil or gas to the surface of the lease, the oil or gas is
considered captured and "produced." Title to and control of that production (other than
perhaps the government's royalty share) then passes by terms of the lease to the lessee.
Sections 6 and 15 of the OCS Lease Form 3300-1, 43 Fed. Reg. 44893 (1978), as corrected
in 43 Fed. Reg. 46586 (1978). Neither the term of any lease nor any statutory authority
specifically authorizes the MMS to require a lessee's production which has been captured
to be reinjected into the leasehold for pressure maintenance purposes. Formation waters
produced incidentally to the oil and gas may be freely used for operations under Section
2(b) of offshore leases. OCS Lease Form 3300-1 (Sept. 1978). In the case of natural gas
most OCS production is also subject to dedication to a particular purchaser under a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued under the Natural Gas Act. 15 U.S.C. §
717-717w (1982). In any case, such dedication could prevent or hamper the MMS' required diversion of the gas for pressure maintenance purposes.
38. The Department of Energy Organization Act in 1977 transferred Interior's authority to
establish maximum rates of production and diligence standards to the newly-created
Department of Energy. Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91
Stat. 565 (1977). However, dividing management responsibilities for
federal oil and gas

leases between two agencies proved unworkable. So Congress returned the above
authorities to Interior.
39. Department of the Interior Appropriations Act-Fiscal Year 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-100,
95 Stat. 1391, 1407; see 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (7) (Supp. V 1981) for authority to impose
diligence requirements on OCS leases.
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of its statutory conservation mission and requires a lessee to engage in
STR operations and sustain production unless such STR operations were
not technically or economically feasible. 40 Basically, this would codify into
regulation for STR purposes the implied covenant of due diligence and also
shift the burden of justifying not undertaking STR operations onto the
lessee on a case-by-case basis. Such an expansive interpretation of the
MMS' power if applied on a case-by-case basis to existing leases, under not
too rigorous standards, would not have radical ramifications upon current
oil and gas lessees. First, in order to continue an OCS lease beyond its
primary term, there must be "production in paying quantities.' ' 41 Otherwise, the lease terminates by operation of law. Thus a lessee must continue
to produce oil or gas from a lease beyond its primary term in paying quantities or lose the lease. 42 The question of whether or not to engage in STR
operations arises at the end of the productive life of a lease, an event which
invariably occurs in the secondary term of the lease. Second, recognizing
that the productive life of a lease is affected by many variables such as the
rate of decline of production, quality of oil and gas being produced,
available markets for the production, and lease bonus and royalty terms,
amongst others, one may assume that a lessee will act in its own economic
self-interest and produce as much of its leasehold reserves as will bring a
reasonable rate of return. Third, the MMS itself has some flexibility
economically to encourage OCS lessees to engage in STR operations. If
STR operations would not be profitable under then-existing lease terms,
the Secretary may reduce royalty rates'4 and may also approve related
revisions of any current OCS lease development and production plan, if the
revision "is the only44 means available to avoid substantial economic hardship to the lessee."
40. Actually the MMS since 1975 has required OCS lessees located in the Gulf of Mexico or
off Southern California to submit plans to engage in STR operations:
Enhanced i and Gas Recovery Operations. Operators shall timely initiate
enhanced oil and gas recovery operations for all competitive and noncompetitive reservoirs where such operations would result in an increased
ultimate recovery of oil or gas under sound engineering and economic pnciples. A plan for such operations shall be submitted with the results of the annual MER review as required in paragraph 3A(3) of this Order.
OSC Order 11, supranote 20.
However, the requirement is not well-known, either by the OCS lessees or the federal
lessor, is not generally applicable to OCS lessees located elsewhere on the federal OCS,
and has had little effect to date upon operations in those two offshore areas.
41. "An oil and gas lease issued pursuant to this section shall - (2) be for an initial period of
- (A) five years ...and as long after such initial period as oil or gas is produced from the
area in paying quantities..... 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b) (Supp. V 1981).
42. Suspensions of operations, and drilling and well reworking operations will also extend the
term of a lease absent "production in paying quantities." Could a lessee request a suspension in order to assess the viability of STR Operations or maintain a lease pending such an
assessment? Section 5(a) (1) of the OCS Lands Act, as amended, allows a lessee to request
a suspension of a lease if the request is in the national interest or would facilitate proper
development of the lease. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (Supp. V 1981).
43. Section 8(a) (3) of the OCS Lands Act allows the Secretary to waive or reduce royalty or
net-profit sharing terms contained in OCS leases "in order to promote increased production on the lease area, through direct, secondary, or tertiary recovery means. . . ." 43
U.S.C. § 1337(a) (3) (Supp. V 1981). Moreover, any oil produced from an "approved tertiary project" is taxed at a lesser rate of tax than other categories of oil production under
the Windfall Profits Tax Act of 1980.26 U.S.C. §§ 4987 and 4993 (Supp. V 1981). Finally
FERC authorizes a lessee to charge a higher than normally applicable price for gas which
is produced by certain "production enhancement procedures." 15 U.S.C. § 3317(c) (5)
(1982); 18 C.F.R. § 271.704 (1982).
44. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(i) (Supp. V 1981).
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Finally, as noted earlier, STR operations usually occur near the end of
the productive life of a given oil and gas reservoir, when the rate of production has begun to drop. Thus, the decision usually facing a lessee is whether
to engage in STR operations or whether to assign his leasehold rights to
the declining production. Theoretically these factors mesh and will usually
cause a lessee to make such a choice voluntarily regardless of any statutory
or regulatory requirement compelling STR operations.
Nevertheless, the dynamic tension between the MMS' and the lessees'
economic interest, the timing of imposition of any STR operations requirement, and the financial status of the lessees in the unit when the requirements are imposed will often cause deviations from the above assumptions about the lessees' behavior.
The MMS as lessor desires to maximize production from any OCS lease
for two reasons. First, the OCS Lands Act requires the MMS to conserve
and protect the resources of the OCS. 45 Second, the lessor receives a royalty on any oil or gas produced on an OCS lease. 46 The more oil or gas that is
produced, the greater the financial return to the lessor.
The OCS lessees, on the other hand, are businesses run for profit. Each
lessee has a rate of return which it seeks to earn from each oil and gas lease
that it acquires and develops. When revenues generated from operations
on a lease fall below that rate of return, the lessee will allocate its limited
resources elsewhere-regardless of the oil and gas resources still producible on that lease.
STR operations, especially tertiary recovery operations, often require
enormous capital outlays which may or may not prolong or increase production from the leases in question. That money often may be invested in
an exploratory lease play elsewhere which promises a greater likelihood of
production generating higher rates of return than would result from attempting to extend the production life of an older field.
With the current decline in price for petroleum products, energy companies generally do not generate internally the capital necessary for ambitious exploration programs. Continued high interest rates simultaneously
cause companies to hesitate to borrow money for pursuit of ambitious exploration programs. One must also consider the financial status of smaller
companies which participate in OCS lease development. Usually those companies bid jointly with the major energy companies and acquire percentage
interests in OCS leases. With less capital available, the smaller companies
may balk at entering into any offshore STR operations even if profitable,
since one STR operation may consume all of the company's available
operating capital and the company still has to attend to operations on other
leases. The amount of funds available for oil and gas activities as a whole is
finite. Thus, if the MMS applied STR operation orders indiscriminately, a
diversion of funds from exploration activity into marginal STR operations
45. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (Supp. V 1981).
46. Sections 5 and 6 of the OCS Lease Form 3300-1 establish a minimum royalty which must
be paid after oil and gas is discovered in paying quantities, and a percentage royalty when
production generates royalty payments greater than the minimum royalty payments.
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and a withdrawal of smaller energy companies from participation in offshore development could occur. Both would impact future domestic oil and
gas production contrary to the stated policy of the OCS Lands Act to increase such production.
Imposition of a general STR operations requirement could even impact
current OCS production. Unlike onshore operations, it is unlikely that an
OCS lessee would be able to sell or assign his leasehold rights, thereby committing its available resources to further exploration and future production
while allowing an assignee to engage in STR operations.4 7 Offshore operations require a special expertise and are very costly. Moreover, potential
liabilities for offshore failure or mishap are enormous. Even if the original
lessee left its development platform in place offshore on the lease it is still
unlikely that the smaller "mom and pop" oil companies which rework old
oil and gas leases onshore possess the expertise or capital to venture offshore to engage in STR operations. Once the original OCS lessee decides
not to engage in STR operations and to relinquish an OCS lease it is unlikely that another developer will seek to obtain assignment of that lease.
Thus, imposition of a general STR requirement on existing OCS leases
by the MMS could force OCS lessees to abandon marginally productive
OCS leases earlier than usual so as to avoid future significant STR-related
expenditures and actually reduce the amount of oil produced by offshore
operations on existing leases. Thus, with the myriad of STR methods
available, and with the individual characteristics of each oil reservoir involved, the MMS should only approach the requirement of STR operations
offshore carefully and on a unit-by-unit basis.
E. Application of STR Orders to Onshore Leases.
Although federal onshore oil and gas leasing occurs under a variety of
statutes and classifications of public land, the BLM's power as administrator of onshore federal oil and gas leases to impose STR operational
requirements is the same as the MMS'.
The Mineral Leasing Act (MLA) governs leasing of public domain lands
48
and acquired lands not otherwise subject to reservation or withdrawal.
Similar to the OCS Lands Act, the MLA authorizes unitization of leases
"[flor the purpose of more properly conserving the natural resources of any
oil or gas pool.' ' 4 9 Moreover, the Secretary must insure under this standard
that natural resources are not wasted and that production of the resources
"accords with prudent principles of conservation."'50 The repeal of section
302(b) of the Department of Energy Organization Act also transferred back
to the Secretary from the Department of Energy the power to set maximum rates of production of oil and gas and establish diligence re47. The OCS Lands Act, as amended, authorizes assignments and relinquishments of OCS
leases. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(aX3) (Supp. V 1981).
48. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-193 (1976 & Supp. V. 1981). See also 30 U.S.C. § 352 (1976) for
authority to lease acquired lands.
49. 30 U.S.C. § 226(j) (1976).
50. California Co. v. Udall, 296 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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quirements for leases
issued under the Mineral Leasing Act and Acquired
ands Leasing Act. 51
Like a federal OCS lessee, an onshore federal oil and gas lessee must
produce oil or gas in paying quantities in order to maintain a lease beyond
its primary term. 52 Also, the rationale behind the implied covenants of
reasonable development and due diligence are equally applicable to federal
oil and gas leases which happen to be located onshore rather than offshore.
So, for onshore as well as offshore oil and gas leases, the BLM may validly
construe its duty to conserve the oil and gas resources in place as authority
to require maximization of production of oil and gas resources in place.
As previously noted, STR operations are intended to increase the
ultimate recovery of resources in place in the oil and gas reservoir. The
BLM would be within its statutory authority to require federal oil and gas
lessees within an onshore unit agreement to engage in STR operations.

II. STATE OR PRIVATE OIL AND GAS LEASE WITHIN
53
THE PURVIEW OF A FEDERAL UNIT AGREEMENT

The pattern of land ownership which developed as a result of American
history makes it unlikely that every onshore lease situated over a common
oil and gas reservoir will be entirely a federal oil and gas lease. Often, onshore leases are situated over a common oil-producing reservoir subject to
both federal and state jurisdiction. The Mineral Leasing Act recognizes this
fact and authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to enter unto unit
which include leases issued on state or privately
agreements onshore
54
owned lands.
51. See 30 U.S.C. § 226(e) (Supp. V 1981); 30 U.S.C. § 226(j) (1976); 30 U.S.C. § 352 (1976);
sections 2(j) and 4 of Public Domain Lands Competitive Lease Form 3120-7 (Feb. 1977);
section 2(j) and 4 of Public Domain Lands Lease Form 3130-4 (Feb. 1977); and sections
2(k) and 5 of the Public Domain Lands Competitive Acquired Lands Lease Form 3130-4
(& Feb. 1977). Not only may the Secretary require diligent production of oil and gas
resources from an onshore oil and gas lease, he may also restrict production from that
lease. 30 C.F.R. § 221.35 (1982).
52. "Competitive leases issued under this section shall be for a primary term of five years....
Each such lease shall continue so long after its primary term as oil or gas is produced in
paying quantities." 30 U.S.C. § 226(e) (Supp. V 1981).
53. It is extremely unlikely that a Unit Agreement involving offshore leases would include
leases issued upon both federal and state lands for two reasons. First, as determined by
the Supreme Court in 1947 in United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947), and codified
by the OCS Lands Act in 1953, all lands beyond the limits of state territorial waters are
under the control of the federal government. Second, Congress amended Section 8 of the
OCS Lands Act in 1978 to include a provision which requires the federal government to
share with adjacent states certain revenues generated from federal OCS tracts situated
within 3 miles of the seaward boundary of coastal states. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(g) (Supp. V
1981).
Assuming the federal government previously had the authority to create a federal/state
OCS Unit Agreement, Subsection (g) acts at least as a disincentive for states to enter into
such an agreement, if not a requirement for the federal government to settle all
federal/state boundary drainage disputes by direct revenue grants rather than any
mutual oil and gas operations.
Thus, this section of the article is confined to consideration of onshore-related problems
where STR operations may be required on a reservoir which lies under federal, state, and
private lands.
54. 30 U.S.C. § 226(j) (1976); 30 C.F.R. § 226 (1982). The onshore unit agreement, interestingly enough, includes within its purview only leases issued under either the
Mineral Leasing Act or Acquired Lands Leasing Act, but fails to mention protective
leases and rights-of-way leases which are also included under the BLM's general leasing
regulations. 30 C.F.R. § 226(d) (1982); 43 C.F.R. § 3100.0-3(c) and (d) (1982).
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In regulating oil and gas leases on state lands, the states have
dev"eloped their own regimes of conservation laws and regulations. Of
course some of those laws and regulations which govern state oil and gas
leases may be contrary to the terms of a BLM order which required unitwide STR operations. For example, the BLM STR order may require a fluid
injection program so as to increase declining oil field pressures. In order to
inject fluids to increase reservoir pressure, the lessees may need to drill additional wells in the oilfield, but drilling of those additional wells would be
contrary to state well-spacing requirements applicable to the field. Another
example is rates of production. STR operations, if ultimately successful,
will increase production rates from wells in the field. The increased production may exceed production rates established by state regulation-forcing
the state to accept greater oil and gas production as the royalty interest
owner from the state leases whether the state approves or not. Thus, the
question arises as to whether the BLM in regulating operations on a unit
agreement which contains both public and state lands may preempt state
conservation laws or regulations in order to fulfill its statutory duty under
the MLA to conserve federal oil and gas resources by requiring STR operations.
A. FederalStatutory Background.
State oil and gas leases, if authorized by the laws of the state in which
the unit is located, are generally subject to state law even though the lands
are included within a federal unit agreement. 56 Moreover, if the federal
government owns less than fifty percent of the acreage contained in a unit
agreement, the oil or gas field involved is fully developed, and the federal
lands account for less than fifty percent of the recoverable reserves in that
unit, the Secretary of Interior may waive the applicability of its own onshore operating regulations to the federal lands within the unit
agreement. 5 Nevertheless, both of these exceptions are subject to the
general MLA mandate to the Secretary under the unit agreement to conduct operations "for the purpose of more properly conserving the natural
resources thereof .... ,,57 Any state or private lessee who enters into the
unit agreement also contractually acknowledges the power of the
Secretary to conduct operations with that purpose in mind.58
The unit agreement also provides a mechanism whereby the unit area
may be expanded to include leases on adjacent lands whenever "expansion
...is necessary or advisable to conform with the purposes of this agreement." 59 This, of course, allows the BLM as unit operator to prevent
drainage of a unitized area by operations on an adjacent lease by requiring
that lessee to join the unit.
55. "When authorized by the laws of the State... appropriate provision may be made in the
[unit] agreement accepting such laws to the extent that they are applicable to non-federal
unitized land." 30 C.F.R. § 226.7 (1982).
56. 30 C.F.R. § 226.8(b) (1982).
57. Paragraph Two of Preamble to Model Onshore Unit Agreement for Unproven Areas; 48
Fed. Reg. 26763 (1983).
58. Id.
59. Id.
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Next, section 1 of the Onshore Unit Agreement appears to limit the
Secretary's powers over production operations on state lands included
within the unit agreement:
Enabling Act and Regulations. The Mineral Leasing Act of
February 25, 1920, as amended, supra, and all valid pertinent
regulations including operating and unit plan regulations,
heretofore issued thereunder or valid pertinent and reasonable
regulations hereafter issued thereunder are accepted and made a
part of this agreement as to Federal lands, provided such regulations are not inconsistent with the terms of this agreement; and as
to non-Federal lands, the oil and gas operating regulations in effect
as of the effective date hereof governing drilling and producing
operations, not inconsistent with the terms hereof or the laws of
are hereby acthe State in which the non-Federal land is 6located,
0
cepted and made a part of this agreement.
The unit form thus only provides for the application of federal regulations
regarding drilling and producing obligations in effect as of the date of the
unit agreement and only if those regulations are not "inconsistent with...
terms of the [agreement] or the laws of the State in which the non-Federal
land is located."
While section 1 of the unit agreement limits the applicability of federal
drilling and producing regulations to state lands, section 1 also incorporates the terms of the Mineral Leasing Act itself. Thus, the MLA's
statutory mandate to "conserve the resources of any oil or gas pool" is incorporated into the unit agreement and would displace any limitation on
the applicability of federal regulations contained in the agreement which
are inconsistent with that statutory mandate.8 1
However, unlike an offshore unit containing solely federal oil and gas
leases, sections 30 and 32 of the MLA are applicable here.6 2 Relevant portions of section 30 read as follows:
Each federal lease shall contain provisions for the purpose of insuring the exercise of reasonable diligence, skill, and care in the operation of said property; a provision that such rules for the safety and
welfare of the miners and for the prevention of undue waste as may
be prescribed by said Secretary shall be observed, including . . .
provisions . . . for the prevention of monopoly and for the safeguarding of the public welfare. None of such provisions shall be in
conflict with the laws of the states in which the leased property is
situated.8 8
Thus, the MLA requires the Secretary of Interior to observe state rules
and regulations in drafting federal lease terms relating to undue waste,
diligence, safety, and monopoly.
60. Id. at Section 1.

61. 30 U.S.C. § 226(e) (Supp. V 1981).
62. 30 U.S.C. §§ 187 and 189 (Supp. V 1981).
68. 80 U.S.C. § 187 (Supp. V 1981).
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Observance of state law requirements relative to prevention of undue
waste and prosecution of diligent operations does not necessarily conflict
with the Secretary's duty to "conserve the resources of the oil or gas pool."
STR operations are concerned with the substantive question of maximizing
recovery of resources in place, while lease terms relating to diligence or undue waste involve the procedure for accomplishing the same objective.
That is, the STR order is aimed solely at producing more oil and gas.
However, methods to ensure prompt development of leases under the STR
order (diligence) and the methods to ensure that the development is carefully accomplished (undue waste) can be accomplished in a manner consistent
with state law requirements. Thus neither section 30 of the MLA nor the
limitations in the unit form regarding federal regulation of drilling and producing obligations would appear to limit the Secretary's power to order
STR operations on units involving both federal and state lands.
Similarly, section 32 (the savings clause) of the MLA also imposes no
limits on the Secretary's power:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed or held to affect the
rights of the States or other local authority to exercise any rights
which they may have, including the right to buy and collect taxes
upon improvements, output of mines, or other
rights, property, or
64
assets of any lessee of the United States.
This proviso preserves to states only "any rights which they may have." It
does not confer any substantive authority upon a state which it does not
already possess. 65
Sections 30 and 32 of the MLA do not limit the power of the Secretary
to order STR operations. Nevertheless, these sections leave unclear the
correct line of demarcation between the federal and state governments for
regulating production operations on state lands within a federal oil and gas
unit agreement.
B. FederalAuthority to Preempt State Law.
There may be situations in which a state law or regulation as applied to
a state oil and gas lease within a unit agrement inhibits the MMS' power to
implement the purpose behind creating the unit agreement in the first
place, the conservation and production of the oil and gas under the leased
lands, and thus may conflict with an STR order.
In Kleppe v. State of New Merico,66 the New Mexico Livestock Board
entered upon public lands of the United States, removed some wild burros,
and sold those burros at public auction. Thereafter, the Bureau of Land
Management asserted jurisdiction over the burros under the Wild FreeRoaming Horses and Burros Act6 7 and demanded that the state recover the
burros and return them to the public lands. A unanimous Supreme Court
held, inter alia, that the complete power which Congress has over public
64. 30 U.S.C. § 189 (Supp. V 1981).
65. Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1979).
66. 426 U.S. 529 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976).

67. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1982).
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lands under the property clause in article IV, section 3, of the United States
Constitution necessarily includes the power to preempt conflicting state
law and to regulate and protect the wildlife living on public lands.6 8 More
importantly, the Supreme Court specifically left open the question of which
"regulations under the Property Clause may have some effect on private
lands not otherwise under federal control,"'69 citing Camfield v. United
States with approval. 0
In Camfield, the Supreme Court upheld federal regulation of fences
built on private land adjoining United States property. These fences had
the effect of enclosing the federal land and giving the private landowner
sole use of public land. The Court found that Congress may exercise its
police power and validly enact a statute which regulates nuisances occurring off federal
lands so long as the statute is directed at protecting the
71
federal lands. '
Thirty years later in a brief opinion, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
Camfield rationale in United States v. Alford holding that Congress could
constitutionally prohibit acts upon privately-owned lands which imperiled
publicly-owned forests.72 Thus, except for the limited extension of power
under the Camfied rationale, the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the power of Congess under the property clause to regulate activities
which occur on state or private lands but which substantially impact adjacent federal lands.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in State of
Minnesota by Alexander v. Block, however, effectively expanded the applicability of Camfield and held that Congress' extra-territorial power includes regulation of conduct on or off public lands which would threaten
either the use or the designated purpose of federal lands. 8 In Minnesota, a
number of individuals, organizations, and businesses challenged the constitutionality of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of
197874 as applied to state lands and waters that came within the congressionally designated federal wilderness area boundaries. The challenged
portion of the statute, section 4, prohibited use of motorboats in all but a
small number of lakes in the wilderness area and limited use of
snowmobiles to two routes through the area. The United States owned
ninety percent of the land in the wilderness area, while the State of Minnesota owned the remaining ten percent which included the beds of all
lakes and rivers within the wilderness area.
The court upheld the constitutionality of the restrictions which Congress applied to motorboat and snowmobile activities on non-federal lands,
68. 426 U.S. at 545.
69. Id. at 546. The property clause of the United States Constitution states: "Congress shall
have power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.
2.
70. 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
71. "While we do not undertake to say that Congress has the unlimited power to legislate
against nuisances within a state ...we do not think the admission of a territory as a state
deprives it of the power of legislating for the protection of the public lands, though it may
thereby involve the exercise of what is ordinarily known as the police power, so long as
such power is directed solely to its own protection." 167 U.S. at 526.
72. United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 (1927).
73. State of Minnesota by Alexander v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1248 (8th Cir. 1981).
74. Pub. L. No. 95-495, 92 Stat. 1649 (1978).
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interpreting the Camfield and Alford cases only to require that: "Congress
...
demonstrate a nexus between the regulated conduct [on non-federal
land] and the federal land, establishing
that the regulations are necessary
' 75
to protect federal property. 1
The circuit court in Minnesota interpreted the Camfield and Alford
cases too broadly, however, in holding only that Congress demonstrate a
nexus between the regulated conduct on the non-federal land and the
federal land. The circuit court ignored the deference Congress traditionally
affords to state and local control over real property within a state.7 6 While
Congress' power to administer federal lands under the property clause is
"without limitation," this does not mean Congress should run slipshod over
state sovereignty and private rights in accomplishing that goal.
77
The Eighth Circuit did recognize this fact in United States v. Brown.
In Brown the Eighth Circuit held that the property clause empowered Congress to prohibit hunting on state waters which were within the boundaries
of Voyageur National Park in order to protect wildlife and visitors on the
land. The court affirmed the district court which had held that the National
Park Service could prohibit through regulation "activities [which]
significantly interfere with the use of the park and the purposes for which it
was established .... ,' 8 Although the Eighth Circuit failed to make an explicit link between the Minnesota and Brown cases, combining the Brown
requirement of "significant interference," with the Minnesotarequirement
of a nexus between activity and effect, creates a standard which allows
Congress to regulate extraterritorially to protect federal lands while
preserving reasonable deference to traditional state and local control over
property within the state.

In summary, current case law suggests that in order to regulate conduct on private lands which affects adjacent federal lands, Congress must
show that the regulation is necessary to protect the federal land (Camfield),
or that the conduct significantly interferes with either the use of the federal
lands or designated purpose of those lands (Minnesota/Brown).
C. FederalProperty Interest in Oil and Gas.
The Rule of Capture in oil and gas operations probably operates to prevent application of the Camfield rationale to unit agreements which involve
federal and state lands. Unlike wild horses or burros on federal lands, the
Rule of Capture prevents the federal government from asserting a property interest in the oil and gas in place under the federal lands. 79 The traditional elements necessary to assert a property interest in an object: "title
to, possession of, or control over" that object, are lacking.80 Title to oil and
gas only passes to the lessee when the oil and gas are produced. Moreover,
75. 660 F.2d at 1249 n.18.
76. Id. at 1251-53.

77. 552 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977).
78. 431 F. Supp. 56, 63 (D. Minn. 1976).
79. See United States v. Hughes, 626 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1980) wherein the Ninth Circuit
found that although the United States probably did not own the wild horses and burros on
federal lands, the United States clearly had asserted a property interest in those horses.
80. Id.at 622.
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oil and gas in place under the lease are neither controlled nor possessed by
the lessee under that same rule.
The doctrine of correlative rights might support assertion of such a
property interest.8 l One element of the doctrine of correlative rights is the
82
right of a landowner to a fair and equitable share of the source of supply;
that is, a specific interest in the oil and gas in place under the lease. Offshore, the OCS Lands Act gives the Secretary of Interior the power to administer the provisions of the Act "for the prevention of waste and conservation of the natural resources of the Outer Continental Shelf, and the protection of correlative rights therein." 83 Unfortunately, with respect to onshore oil and gas leases, the enabling provision of the MLA contains no
such reference to the Secretary's power to protect correlative rights.8 4 The
lack of any reference to "correlative rights" either in the MLA or the onshore model unit agreement was, as with inclusion of sections 30 and 32 in
the MLA, most likely an intentional act of federal deference to state allocation rules for oil and gas production.
Most oil and gas producing states regulate subsurface rights to production from state leases under various rules of allocation, both to prevent
waste and to assure an equitable distribution of supply. 85 For example,
some states create subsurface rights to oil and gas production pursuant to a
rule known as the non-apportionment rule (rather than following the Rule
of Capture).8 6 In either case, a federal assertion of correlative or equitable
rights to a portion of the oil and gas in place beneath the unit agreement
would clash with the method by which these state conservation laws
allocate subsurface rights to the resources. The MLA as well as the onshore
model unit agreement were likely drafted so as not to impinge on these
areas of traditional state regulation. The BLM instead avoids creating any
federal subsurface rights to oil and gas which might clash with state allocation schemes and only gives the lessee a portion of the oil and gas after the
resources are produced or "captured." '
81. See 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supranote 11, at 151: This (sic] term is definedby Nev.
Rev. Stat. section 522.020(1) as follows:
"(Tihe opportunity afforded, so far as it is practicable to do so, to the owner of each
property in a pool to produce without waste his just and equitable share of the oil or gas,
or both, in the pool; being an amount, so far as can be practicably determined, and so far
as can practicably be obtained without waste, substantially in the proportion that the
quantity of recoverable oil or gas, or both, under such property bears to the total
recoverable oil or gas, or both, in the pool and for such purposes to use his just and
equitable share of the reservoir energy.
"There appears to be two aspects of the doctrine of correlative rights: (1) as a corollary of the rule of capture, each person has a right to produce oil from his land and capture such oil or gas as may be produced from his well, and (2) a right of the landowner to
be protected against damage to a common source of supply and a right to a fair and
equitable share of the source of supply."
82. Id.
83. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (Supp. V 1981).
84. 30 U.S.C. § 226(e) (Supp. V 1981).
85. See generaUy 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 11, at 433-70.
86. See 8 H. WLLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 11, at 465.
"Non-Apportionment" is the "[allocation of royalties to a royalty owner having an interest in the specific parcel on which a producing well is located rather than dividing
royalties among the owners of interests in the land subject to the lease." Id.
87. See Model Onshore Unit Agreement for Unproven Areas, supra note 57, at § 11.
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However, ordering unit-wide STR operations will not impinge on state
rules which create subsurface rights to the oil and gas in place. STR operations are intended to increase production for all the lessees-both federal
and state lessees-within the purview of the unit. How that increased production is allocated between the various lessees can still be accomplished
pursuant to applicable state allocation rules.
One district court case, Palila v. Hawaii Dep't. of Land & Natural
Resources,8 however, suggested in dictum that Congress' power under the
property clause was sufficient for Congress to assert a property interest in
an endangered species superior to that of a state.8 9 Although the decision in
the case rested on Congress' treaty-making and commerce clause powers,
it did by analogy suggest that the importanceof preserving the oil and gas
resources may be sufficient to raise oil and gas resources to the level of a
federal property interest.
Congress has recognized that increased production of oil and gas from
federal lands helps promote many significant national goals such as the nation's security and economic wel-being. 90 Production of industrial goods
and defense of the country are seriously jeopardized by the lack of domestic
oil and gas production-national goals as important as preservation of an
endangered species. In order to maintain or increase oil and gas production
from the older onshore units which include federal lands, the BLM needs to
be able to order unit-wide STR operations. Unlike Palila, where the endangered species resided on state-owned land, the resource to be preserved
here resides in a common pool under both federal and state lands and can
also only be preserved by unitary management.
The absence of reference to correlative rights in the MLA and use of
participating areas in onshore unit agreements, therefore, does not
necessarily preclude regulation of STR operations through federal assertion onshore of a property interest in oil and gas in place.
Of course, this result can also be reached by recharacterizing the interest which is being protected and promoted. The federal government is
not attempting to protect the oil and gas per se, but is attempting to protect the orderly production of those resources. An improperly developed oil
and gas reservoir will result in less than maximum recovery of the
resources in that reservoir. Protection of production of oil and gas from
federal lands is an inherently important federal interest as Congress
through the MLA has commanded the BLM to "conserve" federal oil and
gas resources.
D. The Minnesota/Brown Tests.
Turning to the Minnesota and Brown rationales, Congress' power
under the property clause as codified in the MLA should support an STR
88. 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Hawaii, 1979), afd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
89. "But where endangered species are concerned, national interests come into play.... The
importance of preserving such a national resource may be of such magnitude as to rise to
the level of a federal property interest." Id. at 995, n.40.
90. See, e.g., the preamble to the OCS Lands Act Amendments of 1978 (43 U.S.C. § 1802(1)
(Supp. V 1981)).
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order extending federal jurisdiction onto state lands in possible contravention of state conservation laws. The first issue to consider is whether any
tenth amendment concern blocks a federal administrative agency's exercise of federal resource management powers granted by Congress over
91
production activities on adjacent state lands under the property clause.
The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue in the context of the
property clause, but application of the principles utilized in resolving a
similar conflict between Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce
and the tenth amendment suggests that no tenth amendment conflict exists.92 This analogy is appropriate since Congress' power both under the
commerce clause to regulate interstate commerce and under the property
clause to regulate and dispose of public property has been characterized by
the Court as being "without limitation."9
In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association,
Inc.,94 the Supreme Court enunciated a three-part test to be applied to
states' tenth amendment challenges to Congress' exercise of power under
the commerce clause. In upholding federal environmental regulation of surface mining against a state challenge that the regulation preempted local
land use regulation, the Court stated that there must first be
a showing that the challenged statute regulates "States as States."
Second, the federal regulation must address matters that are indisputably "attributes of state sovereignty." And, third, it must be
apparent that the States' compliance with the federal law would
directly impair their ability "to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional functions."1
The regulation of oil and gas operations on state lands within a unit
agreement in this instance fails the first test, as such regulation is directed
at conduct of the lessees rather than the state itself. Simply stated, the
lessees within the unit bear the burden of implementing any STR operations requirement. Those lessees are businesses attempting to develop
their oil and gas leases. While an STR order would be aimed at the commercial activities of the lessees on the state land within the unit area, the state
would still be free to govern the procedures by which each new individual
well was drilled or each already drilled well was reworked. Finally, that the
STR operations requirement is not directed at the state as a state is
reflected in the fact that the order simultaneously affects federal lessees on
federal lands along with state lessees on state lands. This clearly suggests
that the STR operations requirement only incidentally impinges upon state
regulatory prerogatives. The Supreme Court in Hodel, discussing the first
test, stated that congressional regulation of private persons and businesses
is "necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and of the State in which they reside." 96
91. U.S. CONS'r. amend. X provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the People."
92. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 n.17.
93. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976).
94. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
95. Id. at 288-89.
96. Id.
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Thus, no conflict exists between Congress' power to protect federal
resources under the property clause and a state's police power under the
tenth amendment.
1. Interference uith the purpose offederal lands.
Minnesota's first rationale, interference with the designated purpose of
the federal lands, probably will not support an assertion of federal jurisdiction over oil and gas operations on state lands within the unit agreement.
The Minnesota case involved a wilderness area which had been designated
as such by Congress, and the Eighth Circuit placed great emphasis upon
the special federal land use designation. 7 That is, the federal regulation
would extend onto state lands and regulate state activities only to the extent that those activities impeded the purpose behind the specific congressional dedication of the federal land.
Of course, the bulk of federal oil and gas leasing occurs on federal lands
subject to the provisions of the MLA. A number of federal statutes
authorize a panoply of land uses similar to oil and gas leasing, such as mining and grazing, to occur generally on federal lands.98 There is nothing in
the MLA, however, to suggest that onshore oil and gas leasing generally is
considered a special federal land use in and of itself. This conclusion is suggested by the fact that when Congress makes a specific dedication or
withdrawal of federal lands for a particular use, such as a wilderness area
or wildlife refuge, the terms of such dedication or withdrawal also usually
restrict or prohibit oil and gas operations thereon. 99 This vitiates application of the first rationale.
2. The "Significant Interference" Test.
The rationale of Brown, that the conduct on adjacent state lands
significantly interferes with the use of the federal lands, 10 0 should support
issuance of a federal order requiring state oil and gas lessees within the
unit agreement to join in STR operations. By commissioning a unit agreement, the federal government has clearly asserted that the primary use of
the federal lands within the agreement is the development and production
of oil and gas resources underlying those lands-a fact which the lessees on
the state lands have acknowledged by signing the unit agreement. STR
operations are reservoir-wide operations aimed at maximizing production
of oil and gas resources, and should be considered one of the methods for
implementing the MLA's requirement to "conserve oil and gas
resources."1 o Without cooperation of all the lessees whose leases are
within the unit agreement and located over that reservoir, pressure
maintenance or fluid injection programs may fail to maximize production
from the common oil and gas reservoir and may also bring a production
windfall to the recalcitrant state lessee whose lease is adjacent to the STR
operations.
97. 660 F.2d at 1249.
98. See, e.g., the Taylor Grazing Act (43 U.S.C. § 315-315n); and the Mining Law of 1872, 30
U.S.C. §§ 21-54.
99. The Wilderness Act of 1964, for example, withdraws as of January 1, 1984, all lands
within desinated wilderness areas "from disposition under all laws pertaining to mineral
leasing and all amendments thereto." 16 U.S.C. § 1133(dX3) (1976).
100. See text accompanying note 72.
101. 30 U.S.C. § 226(j) (1976).
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Since the success of the STR operations will depend upon cooperation
of all unit lessees, failure of any state lessee to cooperate based upon a contrary state conservation law or regulation will significantly interfere with
the primary use of the federal lands. Lack of cooperation may lead directly
to less than maximum production of resources in place under the federal
lands as well as the state lands in direct derogation of the MLA's statutory
conservation mission. In fact, the recalcitrant lessee may even be compared
in kind if not in degree to the plaintiff in Camfield whose fences and adjoining state lands prevented anyone but the plaintiff himself from enjoying the
federal lands surrounded by fences on state lands. The state lessee who
refuses based on state law to join the STR operation likely receives an increased amount of production in any case from the unit. So the lessee "enjoys" a federal asset while simultaneously preventing the BLM from
achieving its statutory mission.
While the Supreme Court has acknowledged a state's interest in
regulating the exploitation of resources within its borders,102 that rule has
been considerably weakened to permit assertion of what the Court considers paramount federal concerns. 08 "A State may no longer keep the
property, if the sovereign so chooses, always within its jurisdiction for
every purpose." 10 4 Thus, the Minnesota and Brown rationales under the
property clause should be extended to allow the BLM to compel STR operations in units containing mixed federal and state oil and gas leases
whenever failure to engage in such production operations would result in a
less than maximum recovery of federal oil and gas resources in place.
III. STR

OPERATIONS ON INDIVIDUAL
FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES

Often an entire oil reservoir lies under a single federal oil and gas lease.
As previously noted, the MMS/BLM power to compel STR operations in
federal unit agreements is derived from their statutory conservation mission as well as the implied covenants of reasonable development and due
diligence, all three of which should be read into every federal oil and gas
lease. Thus, MMS and BLM may compel STR operations on this basis and
for the same practical reasons which justify compelling STR operations on
federal unit agreements. 05
CONCLUSION

The MMS or BLM may order federal oil and gas lessees to engage in
STR operations if those operations appear reasonably likely to maximize
the ultimate recovery of resources from the federal lease or leases involved.
102. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948).
103. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
104. Id. at 337.
105. May a lessee who owns substantial acreage in a field argue that the particular lease upon
which the MMS has ordered STR operations is already receiving its proportionate share
of development drilling? The one federal case in point says no, treating the obligation of
the lessee as one measured solely by the requirements of and activities on the lease itself.
Amerada Petroleum Co. v. Doering, 93 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1937).
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For offshore operations, the MMS should avoid imposition of any
blanket STR operations requirement. Instead, the MMS should consider
implementation of STR operations with each lessee or group of lessees on a
case-by-case basis.
The BLM's power to order STR operations onshore for maximization
of recovery of resources should be construed to extend to lessees of state
leases who are joined with federal lessees to engage in a common development scheme pursuant to a federal unit agreement. However, the specific
procedures for implementation of the STR operations may be governed,
wherever reasonably possible, by applicable state conservation laws and
regulations.
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